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This paper reports an experiment that examines the relative convergence properties of 
differentiated-product Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies.  Overall, Bertrand markets tend 
to  converge to  Nash  equilibrium predictions more quickly and more completely than 
Cournot markets.  Further, when products are close substitutes Bertrand markets respond 
more quickly to an announced nominal shock.   As products become weaker substitutes, 
however, an increased tendency  for tacit  collusion degrades  convergence in  Bertrand 
markets.  This effect is particularly pronounced following a nominal shock.  Our results 
suggest  that  in  an  oligopoly  context  variations  in  decision  error  costs  dominate  a 
„Strategic Substitutes Effect‟ isolated in previous experimental research.   
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  I. Introduction 
For decades, the convergence properties of Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies have 
been themes of continuing interest among economists.  In Bertrand markets price choices 
are strategic complements, meaning that high expected rival prices induce high optimal 
seller price responses. This incentive for sellers to mimic rivals‟ actions causes Bertrand 
markets to drift, often very slowly, toward equilibrium predictions, as has been observed 
extensively in the experimental literature (e.g., Plott, 1989, Holt, 1995).  On the other 
hand, games where actions are strategic complements uniformly satisfy Milgrom and 
Roberts‟ (1991) Adaptive Learning Criterion („Adaptive Learning‟) and for this reason 
actions converge to the set of underlying Nash equilibrium under a wide variety of 
learning dynamics including Bayesian learning, fictitious play and Cournot best 
responses, among others.  
 The convergence properties of Cournot markets differ distinctly.  The quantity 
choices in Cournot markets are strategic substitutes, meaning that high expected rival 
quantities imply a low optimal quantity choice for a seller.  The incentive for Cournot 
sellers to respond to an expected deviation from the equilibrium by rivals with an own 
deviation in the opposite direction dampens the „drift‟ characteristic of Bertrand markets, 
and thus may hasten convergence.  On the other hand, however, Cournot games with 
more than two players do not uniformly satisfy Adaptive Learning.  In such contexts, 
Adaptive Learning is satisfied only when a „contraction condition‟ holds, namely that the 
absolute value of the slope of each sellers‟ quasi-reaction function is less than one (Vives, 
1999).  Importantly, this contraction condition is violated in a variety of policy-relevant 
contexts, including the standard textbook Cournot oligopoly with homogenous products, 
linear demand and constant unit costs (Theocharis, 1960).
1   
Casual inspection of Cournot market experiments indicates that such markets are 
characterized by an oscillating adjustment path that differs distinctly from the „drift‟ 
typical of Bertrand markets (see e.g., Davis, 2002, or Heemeijer, Hommes, Sonnemans 
and Tuinstra, 2009).  Nevertheless, behavioral evidence on the stability of Cournot 
markets is mixed.   On the one hand, some investigators report a failure of play to 
                                                 
1 In such instances, factors such as inertia in the quantity adjustment process or imperfect product 
substitutability may be added to the market to satisfy the contraction condition (Fisher, 1961).   2 
converge to static Nash predictions in designs where the contraction condition is not 
satisfied (e.g., Cox and Walker, 1998, Rassenti et al. 2000).  On the other hand, in an 
experiment conducted explicitly to examine the effects of satisfying or not satisfying the 
contraction condition, Huck, Norman and Oechssler (2002) report essentially 
indistinguishable levels of convergence to static Nash predictions in both „stable‟ and  
„unstable‟ treatments.
2  
Largely missing from this analysis is an examination of the relative convergence 
properties of Bertrand and Cournot markets.  More specifically, given a fixed underlying 
demand and cost structure, what are the convergence consequences of the „price drift‟ 
characteristic of Bertrand markets, relative to the sometimes questionable stability 
properties of Cournot markets?  This is an important policy question.  In matters of 
institutional design, for example, the selection of price or quantity interactions may be an 
important degree of freedom and it would be well to understand the implications for 
convergence and stability of the option selected.
3   Again, given heterogeneous decision-
makers, the structure of strategic interactions has been shown to importantly affect the 
responsiveness of markets to nominal shocks, both as a theoretical matter (e.g., 
Halitwanger and Waldman, 1985, 1989), and in some experimental research (Fehr and 
Tyran, 2008).  It would be well to know if these results apply to the standard oligopoly 
structures economists use to model imperfectly competitive markets. 
 This paper reports an experiment conducted to examine the effects of altering the 
strategic variable between price and quantity on convergence properties in standard 
differentiated-product oligopolies. The experiment follows a 22 design, where 
treatments are combinations of the strategic variable (price or quantity) and the degree of 
product substitutability.   Variations in product substitutability may impact relative 
convergence tendencies in two ways.  First, as just discussed, when products become 
sufficiently close substitutes Cournot markets fail Adaptive Learning, and for this reason 
may become behaviorally unstable.  Second, in Bertrand markets increases in product 
substitutability raise the costs of deviations from best responses, which may be 
                                                 
2 Huck, Norman and Oechssler (2002) use a probabilistic quantity adjustment rule to generate theoretical 
stability in a theoretically unstable base design.  
3 Although it is perhaps more typical to conceive of sellers as competing on the basis of price than quantity, 
interest in Cournot interactions is widespread.  For example, Daughtey (2008) discusses some 150 papers 
published between 2002-2006 that assume Cournot interactions.    3 
interpreted as the costs of decision errors.  Increases in such costs may enhance the 
convergence properties of Bertrand markets.  Although changes in product 
substitutability do not affect the costs of decision errors in Cournot markets, such costs 
are always higher in Bertrand markets than in Cournot markets (as long as products are 
not completely unrelated), and these costs increase as products become closer substitutes.  
We also explore the relative response of Bertrand and Cournot markets to a 
nominal shock by pausing each session midway through and publicly announcing a 
reduction in cost and demand curves.  The anticipated response of sellers in different 
treatments to a nominal shock are similar to anticipated differences in initial market 
adjustment speeds, but with the difference that a history of play at the pre-shock 
equilibrium provides a reference point that allows psychological factors such as 
anchoring and money illusion to further retard the convergence process in Bertrand 
markets, by enhancing the „drift‟ from the old equilibrium to the new one.
 4  Experimental 
evidence by Fehr and Tyran (2008) suggests that these psychological factors can 
importantly slow convergence in contexts like Bertrand markets where actions are 
strategic complements rather than strategic substitutes. 
By way of overview, similar to Huck, Norman and Oechssler (2002), we find that 
satisfaction or failure to satisfy Adaptive Learning does not affect Cournot markets.  On 
the other hand, changes in decision errors costs do importantly affect Bertrand markets 
and for this reason organize most results.  In initial „pre-shock‟ sequences Bertrand 
markets deviate from static Nash predictions by smaller amounts initially than Cournot 
markets, and converge to static Nash predictions more completely.  Moreover, when 
decision error costs are high (e.g,. when products are close substitutes), the reference 
point of the initial equilibrium does not importantly affect the post-shock adjustment 
process in Bertrand markets.  To the contrary, in the case of close substitutes, Bertrand 
markets respond more quickly and completely to an announced nominal shock than 
Cournot markets.   However, as products become less closely related, the generally 
superior convergence tendencies of Bertrand markets weaken. These effects are most 
                                                 
4 In this context, money illusion means that subjects mistake nominal earnings for real earnings.   Given a 
negative shock, subjects resist adjustment to the new equilibrium to avoid a reduction in perceived 
earnings. Anchoring refers to a tendency for actors to key off a reference choice when uncertain about the 
appropriate or optimal adjustment (e.g,. Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), slowing adjustment to the optimal 
solution.        4 
pronounced following a nominal shock, and in our „low substitutability‟ design, we can 
no longer conclude that Bertrand markets converge more completely than Cournot 
markets post-shock.   Rather than an adjustment inertia, however, we attribute the weaker 
post-shock convergence of Bertrand markets to an increased tendency toward tacit 
collusion in Bertrand markets as product substitutability weakens.  
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  reviews  the 
pertinent literature.  Section 3 presents the experiment design and procedures.  Results 
are  presented  in  section  4,  followed  by  some  discussion  of  bounded  rationality  and 
market convergence in a fifth section.  A short sixth section concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
A limited experimental literature examines the effects of switching the strategic 
variable given underlying demand and cost conditions. Altavilla, Luini and Sbriglia. 
(2006) and Huck, Norman and Oechssler (2000) examine the effects of variations in 
market feedback on the relative performance of Cournot and Bertrand markets.  The 
primary finding in these investigations is that „EXTRA‟ information regarding rivals‟ 
individual action choices and earnings outcomes drives Cournot outcomes toward 
competitive levels, as predicted by Vega-Redondo (1997).  Davis (2002) similarly varies 
information conditions, but focuses primarily on the effects of alterations in the strategic 
variable on the predictive power of the antitrust logit model („ALM‟), a simulation model 
used by antitrust authorities to help identify problematic horizontal mergers.  None of 
these studies, however, focus on convergence properties of the alternative market 
structures.   
Perhaps more pertinent to the present study are a pair of experimental papers by 
by Heemeijer, Hommes, Sonnemans and Tuinstra (2009, „HHST‟) and Fehr and Tyran 
(2008, „FT‟) that study the effects of altering actions between strategic substitutes and 
strategic complements on convergence speeds and levels.  HHST examines a series of 
six-seller „prediction‟ markets, where sellers earn profits by forecasting the next period 
price more accurately than their rivals.  The experiment consists of two treatments, which 
differ only in the strategic relation between seller forecasts and the induced market price 
response.  In a „positive feedback‟ treatment, prices move directly with forecasts, making   5 
forecasts strategic complements.  In the negative feedback treatment the reverse is true, 
making  forecasts  strategic  substitutes.  The  authors  report  significantly  higher 
convergence in the „negative feedback‟ treatment.  
HHST explain their results as a consequence of bounded rationality.  Theoretical 
work by Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985) shows that for a given share of boundedly 
rational agents, the extent to which actions are strategic substitutes affects the speed of 
adjustment  towards  equilibrium.    Intuitively,  in  contexts  where  actions  are  strategic 
substitutes, rational players have an incentive to move away from boundedly rational 
(adaptive)  players,  thus  driving  outcomes  toward  the  equilibrium.    In  contrast,  when 
actions  are  strategic  complements,  rational  players  optimize  by  moving  toward  the 
expected actions of the boundedly rational players, slowing convergence.  For purposes 
of conciseness, in what follows we term the enhanced convergence properties of contexts 
where actions are strategic substitutes rather than strategic complements the „Strategic 
Substitutes Effect‟.  
FT investigates the effects of alterations in the strategic relationship of actions on 
market responses to a fully announced nominal shock.  These authors test the relative 
effects of strategic complements and strategic substitutes in a stylized four seller discrete 
choice price-setting game where the static Nash equilibrium is Pareto optimal.  The game 
is  presented  to  participants  in  a  bi-matrix  format  that  shows  sellers  the  own  profit 
consequences of their own and others‟ average price choices.  Each session consisted of 
two fifteen-period sequences.  At the conclusion of the first sequence, the investigators 
induce a shock that reduces the equilibrium price by half.  At the same time, to keep the 
shock purely nominal, the investigators double the lab/currency exchange rate.  To ensure 
that participants understood the consequences of the shock, they were given a new set of 
tables, and an opportunity to study them.  
FT report dramatic treatment effects in response to the shock.  In the strategic 
substitutes treatment,  adjustment to  the new equilibrium was,  for a large majority of 
participants (67%), immediate.  In contrast, in the strategic complements treatment less 
than a quarter of participants (23%) adjusted immediately to the shock, and sellers needed 
ten  periods  to  match  the  first  period  equilibrium  play  rate  observed  in  the  strategic 
substitutes treatment.     6 
In part, FT attribute their results to the strategic substitutes effect discussed above 
as  support  for  the  results  in  HHST.    Complementing  this  effect,  FT  argue  that  the 
psychological forces of money illusion and anchoring provide  yet further reasons for 
adjustment  inertia  following  a  nominal  shock  in  contexts  where  actions  are  strategic 
complements, since these forces induce some sellers to view the previous equilibrium 
price  as  a  reference  for  future  action.    Analyzing  individual  forecasts  and  prices, 
however, FT further argue that the nature of strategic interactions itself affects rationality, 
because  strategic  complementarity  tends  to  make  subject  expectations  less  forward 
looking, and thus less rational.  When actions are strategic complements, they argue, the 
optimal response to a given deviation from the underlying equilibrium tends to be quite 
small  (e.g,. is  quite  close to  mimicking the  expected deviation), making the costs of 
adaptive expectations relatively small.  On the other hand, when actions are strategic 
substitutes, the optimizing response to a disequilibrium action choice is a large distance 
from the choice (e.g., on the opposite side of the underlying Nash Equilibrium), raising 
the  costs  of  adaptive  expectations.  Thus,  FT  conclude,  when  actions  are  strategic 
substitutes,  adaptive  sellers  commit  larger  errors,  which  stimulates  a  more  rapid 
adjustment of expectations. 
Importantly,  however,  neither  HHST  nor  FT  compare  Bertrand  and  Cournot 
markets.  Parameters in each design are set so that all markets are uniformly stable in the 
sense that they satisfy Adaptive Learning and so that the costs of decision errors remain 
constant across treatments.  As discussed in the next section, holding demand and cost 
conditions  constant,  these  conditions  necessarily  change  when  shifting  the  strategic 
variable between price and quantity.   
 
3. Experiment Design and Procedures 
3.1 Experiment Design. To analyze the relative convergence properties of Bertrand and 
Cournot markets we use a variant of the differentiated-product quadropoly designs 
studied previously by Huck, Norman and Oechssler (2000) and Davis (2002).   The 
differentiated product design is useful in that it allows a symmetrical variation of product 
substitutability conditions in a way that variously satisfies or fails to satisfy Adaptive 
Learning in Cournot markets.  Further, laboratory markets with at least four sellers are   7 
typically presumed to be relatively immune from tacit collusion, a factor that allows us to 
focus on convergence properties.
5  
Consider then a four seller market where each firm produces with no fixed costs 
and with identical marginal costs, c.  Each firm i‟s objective function may be written as 
i i i q c p ) (    ,                (1) 
where firm i optimizes either pi or qi, depending on the nature of interactions.  Assume 
that each firm produces a distinguishable product, with inverse demand given by  
i i i q q a p      3 .                (2) 
In (2)  i q  is the average quantity choice of the other three sellers, and  [0, 1) reflects 
the substitutability between products, with products becoming perfect substitutes as  
approaches 1.  
For a comparable price setting game, sellers optimize (1) with respect to price, 
which requires solving the demand function in (2) in terms of prices.  Solving (2) for 
quantities yields  
i i i p p a q       3 ~                 (3) 



















 .  Observe that the restriction 0<1 implies 
that  .    
  To  develop  static  equilibrium  price,  quantity  and  profit  predictions  for  the 
Cournot game, insert (2) into the expression for pi in (1) and optimize.  Setting qj = qi and 
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5 For example in his meta-analysis of factors affecting tacit collusion in market experiments Engel (2006) 
constructs a „CN‟ index that allows a comparison across experiments.  Assessing the effects of seller 
concentration on tacit collusion, Engel summarizes as follows:  “The CN index supports the experimentalist 
view (that two are few and four are many). There is a positive deviation (from the Nash equilibrium 
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Similarly, static equilibrium price, quantity and profit predictions for the Bertrand 
game may be developed by  inserting (3) for  qi in (1), and optimizing with respect to 
price.  In the symmetric equilibrium, quantities, prices and profits are, 
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 .    (5c) 
The  rightmost  terms  in  (5a)  to  (5c)  are  Bertrand  predictions  expressed  in  terms  of 
Cournot parameters. 
Linear  Cournot  and  Bertrand  games  with  constant  costs  and  a  given  demand 
system are distinguishable in that the static equilibrium for the Cournot game involves 
smaller quantities and higher prices (e.g., Vives, 1999).  In the above system, this can be 
seen by comparing equations (4a) and (4b) with the right side of equations (5a) and (5b).  
For any 0<<1, (4a) < (5a), and (4b) >(5b). 
Given  cost  and  demand  conditions,  best  response  functions  for  Cournot  and 
Bertrand sellers differ in both sign and absolute value.  To see this, find the best response 
function for the Cournot game by inserting (2) into the price expression (1). Optimizing 
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Similarly, the best response function for the Bertrand game is derived by inserting (3) 
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Comparing the slopes of (6) and (7), note that the algebraic signs are different, reflecting 
the strategic substitutability of actions  in  the Cournot  game, in  equation (6), and the   9 
strategic complementarity of actions in the Bertrand game, in equation (7).  Note also that 
the absolute magnitudes of the best response function slopes differ across Bertrand and 





 in absolute value.  This ratio can be unitary only when products are 
unrelated (e.g., =0).  As products become closer substitutes (e.g., as 1) the slope of 
the Bertrand function becomes relatively flatter.
  
Holding constant the algebraic sign of the reaction function slope, changes in the 
slope magnitude do not directly affect predicted convergence properties.  However, two 
related consequences of changes in product substitutability do potentially affect predicted 
convergence.  First, a high degree of substitutability makes Cournot markets theoretically 
unstable.  Observe from (6) that for  >2/3, the slope of the reaction function for Cournot 
markets  in  (6)  exceeds  1  in  absolute  value,  thus  violating  the  contraction  condition 
needed to satisfy Adaptive Learning.    
Second, in Bertrand markets increases in  raise the costs of deviating from Nash 
play.  In a price setting environment, the profits associated with a price deviation pi 
from pBR are  
)) ( ))( ( p q q c p p BR BR BR                      (8) 
Subtracting out BR yields 
) )( ( )) ( ( c p p p q p q q p BR BR             .        (9) 
Expressing qBR in terms of pBR via equation (3), substituting pBR for (7), and observing 
that q(p) = -p, (9) reduces to  
2 2
) 3 1 )( 1 (
2 1
i i
b p p 
 

     
 

  .          (10) 
As can be seen from the right hand expression of (10), the costs of a given deviation from 
best response in a Bertrand game moves directly with .   
Changes in product substitutability do not similarly affect the costs of deviations 
in Cournot markets.  Making a series of substitutions for the Counot game similar to (8) – 
(10) yields  
2
i
c q     ,                  (11)   10 
which remains constant for any .  Moreover, observe that unless products are unrelated 
(=0), Bertrand markets inherently have relatively higher deviation costs than Cournot 
markets: for any positive  the coefficient pi
2 in (10)
 exceeds the unitary constant on 
qi
2 in (11).  
In  an  important  sense,  these  deviation  costs  may  be  viewed  as  the  costs  of 
decision errors.  A large behavioral literature documents the effects of  decision error 
costs  on  convergence  to  a  Nash  equilibrium.  See  in  particular  the  literature  on  the 
Quantal Response Equilibrium, such as Rosenthal (1989), McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) 
and Anderson et al. (1998, 2001).  The relatively higher costs of deviations in Bertrand 
markets may counteract to a greater or lesser extent the much larger magnitude of best 
replies in games with strategic substitutes that FT argue endogenously induce rationality.  
To examine the effects of changes in product substitutability on convergence and 
responsiveness to nominal shocks, we consider =0.5 and =0.9, roughly equal round 
number deviations from the contraction condition boundary of =0.67.   To complete the 
design parameterization we initially set a=80, and c=8. These parameters yield the static 
Nash  predictions  for  each  treatment  summarized  in  the  upper  „pre-shock‟  portion  of 
Table  1.    In  column  (1)  of  the  table,  we  identify  treatments  as  combinations  of  the 
strategic interaction type („B‟ for Bertrand and „C‟ for Cournot) and the degree of product 
substitutability („H‟ for  = 0.9 and „L‟ for  = 0.5).  Thus, for example, „BL‟ in the top 
row of Table 1 lists Bertrand market predictions for the case where =0.5.  
 Notice  from  column  (2)  in  the  pre-shock  portion  of  Table  1  that  under  both 
substitutability conditions the Walrasian and joint maximizing prices are pw=$8 and pJPM 
=$44, respectively. Comparing columns (2) and (3) across row blocks, observe further 
that increasing product substitutability reduces Nash equilibrium prices for both Cournot 
and Bertrand markets.  Further, within row blocks, static Nash predictions for Bertrand 
markets involve lower prices and higher quantities than for comparable Cournot markets, 
as is standard.  For example, in the low substitutability regime shown top row block of 
the table Bertrand and Cournot Nash equilibrium prices are pb =$22.40 and pc= $28.57, 
respectively.  In the high substitutability regime shown in the second row block, Bertrand 
and Cournot Nash equilibrium prices are pb =$10.48 and pc= $23.32.    11 
To examine the response to an announced nominal shock, we stop the session 
after period 40 and announce a shift in the intercept and unit costs to a=40, and c=4, 
along with a quadrupling of the conversion lab/U.S. dollar conversion rate for a second 
„post-shock‟ 40 period sequence.
6  The bottom portion of Table 1 lists reference Nash 
equilibrium predictions for each treatment in the post-shock sequences.  Notice in all 
treatments that all price and quantity predictions fall by exactly half relative to the pre-
shock phase.  
3.2 Conjectures. We are interested in assessing two features of relative market 
performance (a) initial adjustment, or how quickly markets in one treatment adjust either 
at the outset of a sequence or following a shock, relative to markets in another treatment 
and (b) ultimate convergence or the degree to which markets in one treatment ultimately 
approach to  the  static  Nash  equilibrium prediction for their treatment, relative to  the 
ultimate approach of markets to the static Nash prediction for another treatment.  
Consider  first  our  expectations  regarding  initial  adjustment  and  ultimate 
convergence  for  the  BL  and  CL  treatments.  Both  of  these  treatments  markets  satisfy 
Adaptive Learning.  To the extent that the above-discussed Strategic Substitutes Effect 
dominates other pertinent  factors in  oligopoly  games,  we would  anticipate faster  and 
more complete convergence in the CL markets.  On the other hand, the relatively higher 
decision error costs in Bertrand markets works against the Strategic Substitutes Effect. 
Column (5)  of Table 1 provides some sense of the higher deviation  costs in  the  BL 
markets.  In the BL markets a unilateral price deviation equal to 5% of the Walrasian to 
joint maximizing range costs a seller 0.60% of Nash equilibrium earnings.  In contrast, in 
the CL markets a comparable percentage unilateral quantity deviation costs a seller just 
0.25% of Nash equilibrium earnings.  Of course, the larger magnitude of best replies in 
the Cournot markets offsets the higher opportunity costs of a given deviation in Bertrand 
markets.  Nevertheless, the relatively higher costs of decision errors in the BL treatment 
provide a basis for viewing the relative convergence of BL and CL markets as an open 
                                                 
6  We quadruple rather than double the exchange rate here because we reduce by one half both the static 
equilibrium prices and quantities.  Changing only price biases results in favor of Cournot markets since 
quantity-selecting sellers who completely ignore a nominal price shock would remain in equilibrium were 
they to post the initial equilibrium quantity post-shock.    12 
question. These observations form a first conjecture, which we state as a null hypothesis 
to emphasize the open nature of this research question.  
Conjecture  1(a):  When    =0.5 the use of  Bertrand rather than  Cournot  interactions 
affects neither initial market adjustment nor ultimate market convergence.  
  
  Related, but not identical to the relative convergence properties of Bertrand and 
Cournot  markets  in  initial  market  sequences  is  the  responsiveness  to  an  announced 
nominal  shock.    A  history  of  repeated  play  at  (or  at  least  close  to)  the  pre-shock 
equilibrium creates anchoring and money illusion effects that that FT report particularly 
hinder convergence in contexts where actions a strategic complements.  We state this as a 
second part of conjecture 1.   
Conjecture  1(b):  When    =0.5 the use of  Bertrand rather than  Cournot  interactions 
affects neither the initial market adjustment to an announced nominal shock nor ultimate 
market convergence. 
 
Two additional conjectures regard the effects of increased product substitutability.  
First,  in  the  Cournot  treatments  raising    above  0.67  violates  Adaptive  Learning  in 
Cournot markets. To the extent that violation of this condition affects the convergence 
properties  of  Cournot  markets,  we  should  observe  both  slower  and  less  complete 
convergence  in  the  CH  treatment  relative  to  the  CL  treatment.    This  is  a  second 
conjecture, which given an unambiguous directional prediction, we state in alternative 
hypothesis form. 
Conjecture 2: Increasing  from 0.5 to 0.9 slows both the initial adjustment and ultimate 
convergence levels in Cournot markets. 
 
Next, in the Bertrand treatments increasing  raises decision error costs. Over the 
  range considered here these effects are pronounced.  For example, as seen in column 
(5) of Table 1 the cost of a deviation from the Nash price equal to 5% of the Walrasian to 
Joint Maximizing range increases from 0.60% of Nash earnings when  = 0.5 to 4.46% of 
Nash earnings when =0.9.  Although changes in the cost of decision errors may slow the 
initial adjustment process, there is no reason a priori to suspect that these will affect 
ultimate convergence.  The effect of increases in the costs of decision errors is a third 
conjecture, which we also state in alternative hypothesis form.   13 
Conjecture 3: Increasing  from 0.5 to 0.9 speeds the initial adjustment in Bertrand 
markets, but does not affect ultimate convergence. 
 
Combined, conjectures 2 to 3 suggest that as  increases convergence speeds and levels 
should improve in Bertrand markets relative to Cournot markets.  These should improve 
both  initially,  and  following  a  shock.  Nevertheless,  despite  the  predicted  directional 
effects  of  Conjecture  2  and  3,  we  cannot  necessarily  anticipate  absolutely  better 
convergence  properties  in  Bertrand  markets  when    =0.9,  either  pre-  or  post-shock.  
Thus, we offer as a fourth and final conjecture, the following, which, like conjecture 1, 
we state in null hypothesis form, and in two parts.  
Conjecture 4(a):  When    =0.9 the use of  Bertrand rather than  Cournot  interactions 
affects neither initial market adjustment nor ultimate market convergence.  
 
Conjecture 4(b):  When    =0.9 the use of  Bertrand rather than  Cournot  interactions 
affects neither the initial response to a nominal shock nor ultimate market convergence. 
 
3.2 Experiment Procedures. The experiment consists of a series of 24 forty-period 
quadropolies, with six markets in each market type/ degree of product substitutabilty 
treatment cell.  To increase anonymity, markets are conducted in pairs.  At the start of 
each session, eight participants are randomly seated at visually isolated computer 
terminals.  After seating, a monitor reads instructions aloud as participants follow along 
on copies of their own.  The instructions explain that each period sellers simultaneously 
submit price (quantity) decisions as well as forecasts of others‟ mean price (quantity) 
choices on a continuous choice grid.  In the Cournot game, sellers are restricted to the 
quantity range q[0, 50], under the condition that the minimum prices implied by the 
aggregate quantity choices do not fall below unit costs. Symmetrically, in the Bertrand 
game, sellers make price choices over the range p [8, 50].
7  Forecasts are submitted 
under the condition that sellers earn a small „forecasting prize‟ each period the forecast is 
sufficiently accurate.
8  Once all decisions are complete, an automated buyer makes 
                                                 
7 Implied minimum price restrictions in the Cournot markets kept sellers from realizing losses.  Maximum 
prices in Bertrand markets were imposed to keep sellers from inflating rival earnings with excessively high 
price signals. Huck, Normann and Oechssler (2000) show that such truncations do not affect equilibrium 
predictions. as long as the truncated interval includes the Walrasian to joint-maximizing range.  
8 „Accurate‟ is within $0.30 of the subsequently observed others‟ mean price choice in the Bertrand markets 
and within 0.20 units of the subsequently observed others‟ mean quantity choice the Cournot markets. The 
narrower range for the forecasting game in the Cournot markets reflects the narrower effective choice space   14 
purchase decisions in accordance with the appropriate demand condition in Table 1.  At 
the end of each trading period, participants receive as feedback the average action choice 
of the other sellers, whether or not they won the forecast prize, and their own earnings, 
both for the period, and cumulatively.   
In addition to explaining the price (quantity) posting and feedback procedures, 
instructions present to sellers as common information demand and cost conditions as well 
as the number of periods in the market.  To help them better understand their induced 
demand condition we gave participants a profit calculator that allowed them to evaluate 
the earnings consequences of hypothetical own and average others‟ action choices.  
After giving participants an opportunity to privately ask any questions they might 
have, the market begins.  Following period 40 the session is paused, and a shock is 
announced.  Specifically we announce a shift in the intercept and unit costs to a=40, and 
c=4, along with a quadrupling of the conversion lab/U.S. dollar conversion rate for a 
second „post-shock‟ 40 period sequence.  After the second treatment,  participants are 
privately paid the sum of their earnings from the two sequences plus a $6 appearance fee, 
and dismissed one at a time. 
 Participants  were  96  undergraduate  students  enrolled  in  upper  level  business 
courses  at  Virginia  Commonwealth  University  in  the  spring  semester  of  2008.    No 
participant  had  previous  experience  with  a  linear  oligopoly  market,  and  no  one 
participated  in  more  than  a  single  session.    Conversion  rates  were  varied  across 
treatments in order to hold expected payoffs roughly constant across treatments.  In initial 
periods we used a conversion rate of $1800 dollars = $1 U.S. in the Cournot markets with 
=0.5 and $1400 lab =$1 U.S. in the Bertrand markets with =0.5.  When =0.9 lab 
dollar earnings were converted to U.S. currency at a rate of $1000 lab = $1 U.S. in the 
Cournot markets and $200 lab =$1 U.S. in the Bertrand markets.  Post shock, the lab 
dollar/ U.S. currency conversion rate was quadrupled in all treatments.  Earnings for the 
70-90  minute  laboratory  sessions,  inclusive  of  a  flat  $6  payment  for  making  their 
scheduled appointment, ranged from $13 to $40, and averaged $23.75.  
                                                                                                                                            
in those markets, as can be seen by comparing the price and quantity differences between Walrasian and 
joint maximizing outcomes in Table 1.  The size of the forecasting prize was also varied across treatments 
to maintain an approximately constant absolute and relative saliency of the prize across treatments.  With 
=0.9 the per period forecast prize was $10 lab in both the Bertrand and Cournot games.  With =0.5, the 
per period forecast prize was $1 lab in the Bertrand game and $5 lab in the Cournot game.    15 
4. Results 
The mean transaction price paths for each treatment, shown in Figures 1 to 4 
provide an overview of experimental results.
9  Looking first at the BL and CL markets, 
for the initial sequence, shown in panels (a) of Figures 1 and 2, observe that switching 
from  Bertrand  to  Cournot  interactions  elicits  the  expected  effect  on  price  adjustment 
dynamics in the sense that the rather smooth drift of prices across periods in the Bertrand 
markets  is  replaced  by  a  bumpy  oscillation  of  implied  prices  across  periods  in  the 
Cournot markets.  Notice also, however, that the effects of larger decision cost errors in 
the  BL  markets  appears  to  dominate  the  potentially  ameliorative  effects  of  strategic 
substitutes  in  the  CL  markets,  even  in  this  case,  when  the  Cournot  markets  satisfy 
Adaptive Learning.  Except for a single BL „outlier‟ market that drifts far above the Nash 
equilibrium price from periods 18 to 35, convergence is both rapid and complete in the 
BL markets. In contrast, in the CL markets deviations from Nash predictions are large and 
persistent.  
Turning to the post-shock sequences for the BL and CL markets, shown in panels 
(b) of Figures 1 and 2, notice that here the difference in relative convergence tendencies 
is less clear, with most of the difference coming from the Bertrand markets.  Following 
the shock convergence to the underlying NE appears to be less than complete in several 
BL markets.  
Comparing price paths for the BH markets in Figure 3 with the BL markets in 
Figure 1, observe that increasing  clearly improves convergence in Bertrand markets, 
both pre- and post-shock.   Relative to the BL treatment, deviations in the BH series are 
smaller  initially,  and  homogenously  collapse  on  the  static  Nash  equilibrium  price 
prediction.  On the other hand, comparing transaction prices for the CH series in Figure 4 
with the CL series in Figure 2 observe that increasing  does not exert the destabilizing 
effect on Cournot markets predicted in conjecture 2. To the contrary, transaction price 
paths in the CH and CL markets do not differ in any obvious way either in either the pre- 
or post-shock sequences.   Finally, comparing across the BH and CH markets shown in 
                                                 
9 We display transactions prices rather than quantity choices for the Cournot markets to facilitate a 
comparison across institutions.  (The vertical scale of quantity and price choices differ.)  A display of 
Cournot quantity choices and Bertrand transactions quantities yields similar results.    16 
Figures 3 and 4, observe that when =.9 prices convergence much more quickly and 
completely in the BH treatment, both pre-shock and post-shock. 
The pairwise comparisons of absolute median price deviations shown in Figures 5 
to 8 allow a quantitative evaluation of conjectures 1 to 4.  In what follows we assess 
initial response in terms of differences in absolute median deviations in the first several 
periods of a sequence (usually the first 10) and ultimate convergence levels in terms of 
differences  in  absolute  median  deviations  for  the  final  several  periods  in  a  sequence 
(again, usually the last 10).  Looking first the BL and CL treatments, shown in Figure 5, 
observe that in the pre-shock sequences, median absolute deviations for the CL markets 
track almost uniformly above their BL counterpart.   Further, as indicated by the hollow 
and solid dots printed at the top of the panel, the initial adjustment process in Bertrand 
markets is more rapid.  Using a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test, the null hypothesis that 
the absolute median deviations in the BL and CL markets are equal can be rejected at 
p<.10 in 5 of the first 10 periods (and in 8 of the first 13 periods).  Similarly the same 
null hypothesis can be rejected at p<.05 in 3 of the first 10 periods (or in 5 of the first 13 
periods).  Differences in ultimate convergence levels, however, are much smaller.  In the 
last 10 periods, the null of no difference across treatments  can be rejected in only 3 
instances and only at p<.10 in each instance. This is a first finding. 
Finding 1(a): In the pre-shock sequence initial adjustment in BL markets is more rapid 
than in CL markets.  Ultimate convergence, however, does not differ significantly across 
the BL and CL treatments.  
 
Turning to the post-shock sequences for BL and CL treatments, shown in the right 
panel of Figure 5, observe that although the absolute median path for the CL markets 
again tracks largely above the BL treatment counterpart in initial periods the differences 
are  infrequently  significant.    For  example,  the  null  hypothesis  that  median  absolute 
deviations in the BL and CL markets are equal can be rejected at p<.10 in only 2 of the 
first 10 post-shock periods, and only one of these (in period 1) is significant at p<.05.  
Evidence regarding differences in ultimate convergence levels is even weaker.  Absolute 
median price deviations across the BL and CL treatments do not significantly differ at 
p<.10 in any of the final 10 periods and only once in the last 20 periods.  This is a second 
finding.   17 
Finding 1(b): The more rapid initial adjustment of BL markets relative to CL markets 
does  not  carry  over  to  periods  following  an  announced  nominal  shock.  Post-shock, 
ultimate convergence also does not differ significantly across the BL and CL treatments. 
 
The comparisons of median absolute deviations within  market  type, shown in 
Figures 6 and 7, allow evaluation of conjectures 2 and 3, respectively. From the absolute 
median  price  deviations  for  the  Cournot  treatments,  shown  Figure  6  observe  that, 
contrary to conjecture 2, changing  does not behaviorally affect convergence. Both pre- 
and post-shock, the CH and CL series largely overlap throughout the session.  Using a 
one-tailed Mann-Whitney test, the null hypothesis CH deviations are no larger than their 
CL counterpart can be rejected only occasionally and only in the pre-shock sequence (at 
p<.10 in only five periods and at p<.05 only once).  Further, these occasional rejections 
of equal median deviations are scattered throughout the pre-shock sequence and follow 
no obvious pattern.  This is a second result, which parallels related findings by Huck, 
Normann and Oechssler (2002). 
Finding 2: Increasing  from 0.5 to 0.9 affects neither initial adjustments nor ultimate 
convergence in Cournot markets.  
 
Turning to the median absolute deviations for the Bertrand markets in Figure 7, 
observe that increasing  does systematically improve Bertrand market convergence both 
pre- and post-shock.  In the pre-shock periods, median absolute deviations for the BH 
treatment  lie  consistently  below  their  BL  counterparts,  particularly  in  initial  periods. 
Using  a  one-tailed  Mann-Whitney  test  the  null  hypothesis  that  median  absolute 
deviations in the BL series are no greater than in the BH series can be rejected at p<.10 in 
8 of the first 10 periods, and at p<.05 in four of those instances.  Toward the end of the 
sequence, differences become less regular, but even here are still fairly frequent.  The 
same null of no difference across treatments can be rejected at p<.10 in 4 periods and 
p<.05 in 3 of those instances. 
 Post-shock,  the  enhanced  relative  convergence  tendencies  of  BH  markets  are 
even more consistently significant: the null hypothesis that median absolute deviations in 
the BL series are no greater than in the BH series can be rejected at p<.10 in each of the 
first 10 periods and at p<.05 in 5 of those instances.  In the last 10 periods the same null   18 
can be rejected at p<.05 in all 10 comparisons.  This support for conjecture 3 is a third 
finding. 
Finding 3. Raising  improves both initial market adjustments and ultimate convergence 
levels in Bertrand markets.  Differences are most persistent in the post-shock sequences.  
 
The  powerful  convergence-enhancing  effects  of  increased  substitutability  in 
Bertrand  markets  also  have  the  effect  of  generating  overwhelmingly  superior 
convergence properties for BH markets relative to CH markets. As seen in Figure 8, not 
only do the absolute median price deviations in CH markets uniformly exceed their BH 
market counterparts, but the differences are almost uniformly significant both initially 
and in terminal periods.  In the pre-shock sequence, the null hypothesis that absolute 
deviations in BH and CH sequences do not significantly differ can be rejected at p<.05 in 
each of the first 10 periods.   Ultimate convergence levels for the BH treatment also 
appear to be higher.  In the last 10 periods the same null can be rejected at p<.10 in 5 
instances and at p<.05 in 3 of these comparisons.  
Post-shock, the differences are still more pronounced.   Initially, median absolute 
deviations for the BH treatment are significantly smaller than their CH counterpart at  
p<.05 in each of the first 10 periods. Similarly, ultimate convergence levels for the BH 
treatment are unambiguously higher.  The null of no difference across treatments can be 
rejected at p<.10 in each of the last 10 periods and at p<.05 in 9 of those comparisons.  
These results support a fourth finding. 
Finding 4. Initial adjustments are more rapid and ultimate convergence more complete 
in the BH markets than in the CH markets.  This is true both pre-shock as well as post-
shock. 
 
Prior to closing this subsection, we offer an alternative assessment of ultimate 
convergence levels by evaluating treatment outcomes in terms of individual decisions.  
Such  an  analysis  usefully  allows  distinction  of  instances  where  disperse  individual 
actions yield average transaction prices close to Nash predictions, from instances where 
sellers are homogenously close to making equilibrium plays. More specifically, we assess 
ultimate convergence levels  in  terms  of the propensity of  individuals  to  make action 
choices close to the Nash equilibrium choice.  Defining a „neighborhood‟ as a percentage 
of the range between Walrasian and joint-maximizing outcomes, we report in column (1)   19 
of  Table  2  the  average  percentage  of  individual  choices  within  5%  and  10% 
neighborhoods of the static Nash equilibrium action for the last 10 periods of the pre-
shock and post-shock sequences.
10  Starting with the pre-shock sequence, shown in the 
upper panel, observe first the essentially complete convergence of the BH treatment.  For 
this treatment 90% of plays are within 5% of the Nash equilibrium, a level that is both 
high absolutely, and relative to the other treatments.  The comparable average for the BL 
treatment (of 52%) is 38 percentage points lower, which in turn exceeds the comparable 
averages for either of the Cournot treatments by another 23 to 25 percentage points.  As 
indicated  in  columns  (4),  (5)  and  (6),  all  of  these  across-treatment  differences  are 
significant at p<.05 using a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test.  
Results for the broader 10% neighborhood about the Nash equilibrium, shown in 
the second row block in Table 2, provides a basis for distinguishing the BL markets from 
the  Cournot  treatments.    Over  the  last  10  periods,  80%  of  action  choices  in  the  BL 
markets satisfy this weak convergence standard, compared to only 47% and 37% for the 
CH and CL markets, respectively. The mean differences between the BL markets and the 
Cournot markets are significant at p<.05, using a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test. 
That neither Cournot treatment has more than 50% of action choices within 10% 
of the Nash equilibrium in the final pre-shock periods merits some emphasis.  The low 
level of behavior consistent with Nash equilibrium play even under this weak standard 
suggests that in the initial periods Cournot markets in a non-trivial sense, remain non-
convergent.   
Turning to the post-shock sequences, summarized in the bottom half of Table 2, 
observe that in many respects, the ultimate convergence levels observed in the pre-shock 
sequences carry over to the post-shock sequences.  For the BH markets the individual 
Nash play rates of 90% using a 5% neighborhood and 93% using a 10% neighborhood, 
virtually duplicate the pre-shock Nash play rate for this treatment.  Similarly, in the post-
shock sequences the CL and CH markets remain largely non-convergent.  Post-shock, no 
                                                 
10 The final 10 periods are used to assess ultimate convergence behavior only for purposes of specificity. 
Results, however, are not terribly sensitive to the choice of the final periods. For example, in Table A1 of 
an online data appendix, reports results comparable to Table 2 but using the final five periods of each 
treatment as a basis of comparison.  Results are essentially identical to those reported in Table 2.    20 
more than 28% of plays in the last 10 periods are even within 10% of the Walrasian to 
joint-maximizing quantity range in either Cournot treatment.   
The primary difference in pre- and post-shock outcomes is the reduced incidence 
of Nash plays in the BL treatment.  For the BL treatment the incidence of plays within 5% 
of  the  Nash  prediction  falls  from  52%  pre-shock  to  39%  post-shock.    Again,  the 
percentage of plays that fall within the broader 10% neighborhood of the Nash prediction 
falls from 80% pre-shock to 54% post-shock.  Although the rate of action choices within 
10% of the Nash prediction for the BL treatment post-shock remains roughly twice as 
high as the comparable number for either the CH and CL treatments, the variability of 
outcomes  within  the  BL  treatment  make  this  difference  insignificant  at  p<.10.    We 
summarize these observations with the following comment. 
Comment 1:  Both pre- and post-shock ultimate convergence levels are very high in BH 
markets and are uniformly so low in the Cournot treatments that the Cournot markets 
may,  in  a  non-trivial  sense,  be  regarded  as  ‘non-convergent.’  In  the  BL  treatment 
markets  exhibit  significantly  higher  ultimate  convergence  levels  than  observed  in  the 
Cournot treatments pre-shock.  Post-shock, however, ultimate convergence levels across 
the BL and Cournot treatments no longer significantly differ.  
 
5. Herding Behavior and Tacit Collusion in Oligopolies  
The slower and less complete convergence in the CL and CH treatments relative 
to the BL and then to the BH treatment is consistent changes in decision error costs across 
treatments listed in column (4) of Table 1.  These results differ starkly from the superior 
performance  of  contexts  where  actions  are  strategic  substitutes  rather  than  strategic 
complements observed by FT and HHST, and the pattern of outcomes lead us to broadly 
conjecture  that  in  oligopoly  contexts,  changes  in  decision  error  costs  dominate  the 
Strategic  Substitutes  Effect.    However,  other  differences  exist  between  the  oligopoly 
context we examine here and the more stylized environments examined by FT and HHST, 
and these design differences may interact with changes in decision error costs across 
treatments in a way that contributes to the observed outcomes.  In this subsection we 
consider two such differences, herding behavior, and tacit collusion.   
5.1 Herding Behavior in an Oligopoly Environment. In both HHST and FT, sellers 
almost  uniformly  made  best  responses  to  their  forecasts  of  rival  behavior  (In  HHST 
sellers submitted forecasts and best responses were „hard-wired‟ into the design.  In FT,   21 
the  bi-matrix  structure  of  game  made  best  responses  an  overwhelmingly  dominant 
choice.)  Best response behavior is far less standard in oligopoly games.  Indeed, Huck, 
Norman and Oechssler (2002) attribute the unpredicted stability observed in an „unstable‟ 
Cournot design to a propensity of sellers to imitate the anticipated actions of their rivals.  
 „Herding‟ behavior of this type is a natural response of players who are uncertain 
as to how to play.  In comparing Cournot to Bertrand environments, however, we observe 
that sellers‟ propensities to follow an imitation strategy injects far more variability into 
the former, because the difference between an anticipated action and the best response to 
that action is far greater in the Cournot environment.  
The four panels of Figure 9, which plot the response of sellers to their forecast of 
rival  actions  in  the  first  10  periods  after  the  shock  illustrates.    In  the  BL  and  BH 
treatments, shown in the left panels, the relation between actions (shown as individual 
markers) and best responses (shown as a solid line) is quite high because the distance 
between copying of rivals‟ anticipated actions  (shown as a dashed line) and the best 
response  to  those  actions  are  quite  small.    The  correlations  between  prices  and  best 
responses  in  the  BL  and  BH  treatments  are  strongly  positive,  at  .83  and  .77, 
respectively.
11   In stark contrast, in the CL and CH treatments, shown as the right panels, 
the correlations between rival quantity forecasts and best responses are strongly negative 
at -.65 and -.60, respectively, because many sellers imitate the expected actions of rivals 
rather than best respond to those expectations.   
Our point here is not that Bertrand markets induce rationality.  To the contrary, 
we believe that the rationality of participants  is  largely independent of the nature of 
strategic interactions.
12  Rather, we observe that the difference between imitating and best 
responding to rivals‟ expected actions is small and decreasing as products become closer 
                                                 
11 The correlation reported for the BH treatment omits the four outliers in the lower left panel of Figure 9 
that were obvious price signals. Further for all treatments we eliminate a limited set of forecasts that are out 
of the range of possible action choices (e.g., prices or quantities above 50).  Finally, the scattergrams in 
Figure 9 use data from periods 41-50 for purposes of specificity.  The tendency to imitate rather copy 
forecasts however, is quite general.  Figure A1 in an online appendix illustrates comparable scattergrams 
for periods 1-10. Responses in these initial periods are generally more dispersed that those shown in Figure 
9.  However, correlations between forecasts and actions are very similar to those reported in the text, 
particularly in the respect that they are large and positive in the Bertrand markets and large and negative in 
the Cournot treatments 
12 In fact, in Table A2 of an online appendix we show that the relative proximity of action choices to best 
responses and imitation are roughly equal in all treatments.   22 
substitutes  in  Bertrand  markets,  while  in  Cournot  markets,  the  difference  between 
„imitating‟  and  best  responding  to  rivals  actions  is  large  and  increasing  as  products 
become closer substitutes.  The capacity of sellers to „herd‟ rather than best respond to 
others‟ anticipated actions in standard oligopoly contexts  importantly and persistently 
impedes  the  adjustment  process  for  Cournot  competitors.    We  summarize  these 
observations as the following comment. 
Comment 2. A propensity for sellers to imitate rivals’ expected action choices 
importantly undermines convergence in Cournot markets. The effects of imitation are 
more pronounced in Cournot than in Bertrand markets because the distance between best 
responses and forecasts are far larger in the Cournot markets. 
 
5.2  Tacit  Collusion  in  Bertrand  Markets.  A  second  difference  between  our 
oligopoly markets and the designs studied in FT and HHST is that in our markets, the 
static Nash equilibrium is not a Pareto dominant outcome, so sellers can increase earnings 
by successfully coordinating tacitly.  Looking back at the mean contract price series in 
Figures 1 to 4, we observe that a propensity for prices to drift above the static Nash 
equilibrium occurs most obviously in the BL treatment.  In this treatment, a single outlier 
market deviates above the static Nash prediction pre-shock.  Post shock, several markets 
drift  above  the  static  Nash  prediction  for  many  periods.  Both  pre-  and  post-shock, 
however, the deviations are not a consequence of an initial adjustment inertia, but rather 
of subsequent pries that persistently exceed the Nash prediction, an outcome we attribute 
to tacit collusion.
13  
We are certainly not the first to observe an increased propensity to tacit collusion 
in Bertrand markets.   In a meta-analysis of experiments examining Cournot and Bertrand 
market competition Suetens and Potter (2007) conclude that Bertrand markets are more 
susceptible  to  tacit  collusion  than  Cour not  markets.    Potters  and  Suetens  (200 9) 
subsequently report duopoly experiment designed to isolate the effect of changing the 
                                                 
13 Closer consideration of action choices supports the conclusion that the observe price drift in the BL 
markets is attributable to tacit collusion, in the sense that the prices are the result of consistent seller 
signaling behavior. Table A3 in an online appendix records for each session of each treatment two types of 
action signals, „spikes‟ and „surges‟.  Spikes are large deviations which reduce expected sales to zero, while 
surges are smaller, but more persistent price increases (or quantity reductions).  Overall, Bertrand sellers 
engage much more signaling activity than Cournot sellers.  Within Bertrand markets, repeated price 
„surges‟ which are much more prevalent in the BL treatment, are strongly correlated with instances of high 
transaction prices.   23 
form of strategic interactions on the propensity of sellers to tacitly collude and find that 
holding all else equal  average cooperation levels  are more than twice as  large under 
complementarity than under substitutability.
14  Our results contribute to these previous 
findings in two respects.  First, the incidence of tacit collusion in Bertrand markets is not 
constant,  but  rather  increases  as  products  become  weaker  substitutes.    Decreased 
substitutability both reduces the costs to sellers of signaling an intention to cooperate as 
well as the benefits of deviating from a cooperative arrangement.
15  In our BH treatment, 
where „signaling costs‟ are very high, we observe no greater tendency for tacit collusion 
to affect prices than in either Cournot treatment.   
Second, we observe an increased incidence of tacit collusion in the BL treatment 
in the post-shock periods.  Although our sample is small, we speculate that this outcome 
is due to a sort of „money illusion‟ effect: sellers, accustomed to high nominal earnings 
find natural efforts to coordinate on prices that restore nominal earnings to their pre-
shock  levels.    Interestingly,  this  consequence  of  „money  illusion‟  differs  from  that 
suggested by FT in that it affects not the immediate response to a shock (indeed all but 
one of the BL markets adjusted to the post shock equilibrium within a few periods), but to 
a  propensity  of  sellers  to  try  and  coordinate  in  the  post  shock  environment.    We 
summarize these observations as a third and final comment.  
Comment 3: Tacit collusion can retard adjustment in Bertrand markets.  The propensity 
toward tacit collusion becomes more pronounced as products are weaker substitutes, and 
following a nominal shock. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper reports an experiment conducted to assess the relative convergence 
properties of Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies.  As a theoretical matter, we observe that 
countervailing factors make the relative convergence properties of Bertrand and Cournot 
markets an open question, a priori.  On the one hand, the „Strategic Substitutes Effect‟ 
observed by HHST and FT suggests that contexts where actions are strategic substitutes 
                                                 
14 As with HHST and FT, Potters and Suetens (2009) explain their results in terms of bounded rationality: 
when actions are strategic complements rather than substitutes, rational players optimize by moving toward 
the actions of the boundedly rational players.  In a repeated context, a tendency to copy the actions of other 
(high pricing) sellers, facilitates tacit collusion. 
15 Davis (2009) makes a similar observation in a homogeneous product context, but where the costs of 
deviation are varied by increasing excess supply.   24 
(such as a Cournot market) converge more quickly, and respond to announced nominal 
shocks more fully than contexts where actions are strategic complements (such as 
Bertrand markets) because when products are strategic substitutes rational agents 
optimize by moving away from rather than emulating the expected actions of their 
boundedly rational counterparts.   On the other hand, if products are insufficiently 
differentiated, Cournot markets are unstable in the sense that they do not satisfy the 
Milgrom and Roberts‟ Adaptive Learning Criterion.  Further, holding demand and seller 
cost conditions constant, the costs of deviating from a best response are higher in a 
Bertrand market than in its Cournot counterpart and these deviation costs increase as 
products become closer substitutes.   
Experimental results indicate that in general, the latter of these effects dominates 
the former, and Bertrand markets converge to Nash equilibrium predictions more quickly 
and  more  completely  than  Cournot  markets.    Although  Cournot  markets  are  largely 
unaffected by the satisfaction of or failure to satisfy Adaptive Learning,  outcomes in 
Cournot markets remain persistently variable even in final periods of a sequence.   In 
Bertrand  markets  convergence  is  generally  more  complete  and  improves  as  products 
become close substitutes, a result consistent with the high and increasing decision error 
costs in Bertrand markets.  Further, when products are close substitutes, Bertrand markets 
respond more quickly to an announced nominal shock.   
 Supplementing the effects of higher decision error costs in Bertrand markets is a 
tendency in  standard oligopoly  contexts  for  many  sellers to  „herd‟ by  mimicking the 
anticipated  actions  of  rivals.    Herding  behavior  particularly  affects  convergence  in 
Cournot markets because the distance between the anticipated actions of rivals and the 
best response to those actions is very large.  On the other hand, as products become 
weaker substitutes, an increased tendency  for tacit collusion degrades  convergence in 
Bertrand markets.  This effect is particularly pronounced following a nominal shock, 
where the reference outcomes in the pre-shock phase encourage price-signaling activity.  
These results are important in that they suggest that the adjustment from price 
setting  Bertrand  games  to  quantity  setting  Cournot  games  may  have  important 
consequences for market stability.  When products are sufficiently close substitutes, a 
market conducted under Bertrand interactions converges more quickly and completely   25 
than if conducted under Cournot interactions.  As products become less closely related, 
the difference becomes less pronounced, due to an increased tendency for tacit collusion 
in Bertrand markets.  
   26 
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Table 1.  Parameters and Static Nash Predictions 
  Static Nash Predictions     
(1)  (2) pi  (3) qi  (4) i    (5)  Deviation Costs
a  
 
Pre-Shock Sequence  
Low Substitutability  (c=8,   
 




j i i p p q q q p 4 . 6 . 1 32 5 . 0 80 ) 
BL  $22.40  23.04  $331.78    0.60% 
CL  $28.57  20.57  $423.18    0.25% 
Joint Max.  $44.00  14.40  $518.40     
Walrasian  $8.00  28.80  $0     
 
High Substitutability (c=8,  ) 43 . 2 57 . 7 62 . 21 9 . 0 80  
 




j i i p p q q q p  
BH  $10.48  18.79  $46.65    4.46% 
CH  $23.32  15.32  $234.68    0.25% 
Joint Max.  $44.00  9.73  $350.27     
Walrasian  $8.00  19.46  $0     
 
Post-Shock  Sequence 
Low Substitutability (c=4,  ) 4 . 6 . 1 16 5 . 0 40  
 




j i i p p q q q p  
BL  $11.20  11.52  $82.94   
 
0.60% 
CL  $14.29  10.29  $105.80    0.25% 
Joint Max.  $22.00  7.20  $129.60     
Walrasian  $4.00  14.40  $0     
 
High Substitutability (c=4,  ) 43 . 2 57 . 7 81 . 10 9 . 0 40  
 




j i i p p q q q p  
BH  $5.24  9.39  $11.66    4.46% 
CH  $11.66  7.66  $58.67    0.25% 
Joint Max.  $22.00  4.86  $87.57     
Walrasian  $4.00  9.73  $0     
Key: 
a Own earnings lost due to a five percent deviation from the best response to rivals‟ expected actions, 
expressed as a percentage of Nash equilibrium earnings.   30 
 
 
Table 2. Percentage of Action Choices within a Neighborhood of the Nash 
Equilibrium, Periods 31-40
a 


















52%  BL 
 
--  0.13  0.11 
29%  CH 
   
--  0.47 
25%  CL 
     
-- 
10% Neighborhood 









47%  CH 
   
--  0.33 
37%  CL 
        Post-Shock 
5% Neighborhood 




39%  BL 
 
--  0.63  0.20 
25%  CH 
   
--  0.26 
16%  CL 
     
-- 
10% Neighborhood 
93%  BH  --  0.15  0.00
*  0.00
* 
54%  BL 
 
--  0.34  0.29 
27%  CH 
   
--  0.81 
28%  CL 
     
-- 
Key: In each treatment we define a „neighborhood‟ as deviations from the Nash equilibrium prediction that 
are less than or equal to either 5% or 10% of the Walrasian to Joint Maximizing Range. Entries in columns 
(4) to (6) report p values for a test of the null hypothesis that the row and column treatments do not differ. 
„*‟s highlight instances where the treatments at p<.05 using a two tailed Mann-Whitney test.    
   31 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean Transaction Prices, BL Treatment. 
 
 

















































































































(b) Post-Shock   33 
 
Figure 5. Absolute Median Price Deviations, BL and CL. Key: Circles indicate periods 
where the null hypothesis that median price deviations are equal in the two treatments is 
rejected. „‟ p<.05, „‟ p<.10. (Two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests).   
 
Figure 6. Absolute Median Price Deviations, CH and CL. Key: Circles indicate periods 
where the null hypothesis that median price deviations are equal in the two treatments is 
























































































-  34 
 
Figure 7. Absolute Median Price Deviations, BH and BL. Key: Circles indicate periods 
where the null hypothesis that median price deviations are equal in the two treatments is 
rejected. „‟ p<.05, „‟ p<.10. (One-tailed Mann-Whitney tests). 
 
Figure 8. Absolute Median Price Deviations, BH and CH. Key: Circles indicate periods 
where the null hypothesis that median price deviations are equal in the two treatments is 
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Figure 9. Action choices and best responses to forecasts, periods 41-50.   36 
 
 
Table A1. Percentage of Action Choices within a Neighborhood of the Nash 
Equilibrium, Periods 36-40 


















45%  BL 
 
--  0.30  0.15 
30%  CH 
   
--  0.47 
24%  CL 
     
-- 
10% Neighborhood 









47%  CH 
   
--  0.33 
37%  CL 








41%  BL 
 
--  0.52  0.17 
30%  CH 
   
--  0.19 
17%  CL 
     
-- 
10% Neighborhood 
93%  BH  --  0.15  0.00
*  0.00
* 
54%  BL 
 
--  0.34  0.29 
27%  CH 
   
--  0.81 
28%  CL 
     
-- 
Key: In each treatment we define a „neighborhood‟ as deviations from the Nash equilibrium prediction that 
are less than or equal to either 5% or 10% of the Walrasian to Joint Maximizing Range. Entries in columns 
(4) to (6) report p values for a test of the null hypothesis that the row and column treatments do not differ. 
„*‟s highlight instances where the treatments at p<.05 using a two tailed Mann-Whitney test.      37 
 
Table A2.  Absolute and Relative Proximity to Action Anchors 
  Absolute Proximity    Relative Proximity 
 
Periods 2-20 












BH  78%  64%  62%    43%  24%  33% 
BL  46%  54%  55%    31%  30%  39% 
CH  18%  17%  26%    33%  31%  36% 
CL  20%  25%  28%    30%  33%  38% 
Overall          34%  29%  36% 
 
Periods 21-40 
BH  90%  83%  83%    39%  23%  38% 
BL  58%  65%  75%    25%  28%  47% 
CH  34%  31%  40%    40%  23%  37% 
CL  33%  30%  37%    32%  29%  39% 
Overall          34%  26%  40% 
Key: „Absolute Proximity‟ is the percentage of action choices that are within 5% of the Walrasian to Joint 
Maximizing range of the anchor.  „„Relative proximity‟ is the percentage of action choices that are 
relatively closer to one anchor than to the others. „Optimization.‟ is a best reply to an agent‟s forecast of 
others‟ actions, „Herding‟ is an agent‟s forecast of others‟ actions and „inertia‟ is an agent‟s previous period 
action.  
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BH  6/ 0  7/ 0  9/ 0  4/ 0  7/ 0  4/ 0  37/ 0 
BL  1/ 0  0/ 0  6/ 14  2/ 26  4/ 12  2/ 21  3/ 73 
CH  0/ 11  0/ 0  0/ 0  0/ 0  0/ 0  0/ 0  0/ 11 
CL  0/ 0  0/ 11  0/ 0  0/ 11  0/ 11  0/ 0  0/ 33 
 
Post Shock Sequence 
BH  10/ 0  11/ 0  11/ 0  5/ 0  15/ 0  5/ 0  52/ 0 
BL  0/ 33  0/ 0  2/ 0  0/ 13  5/ 11  3/ 31  10/ 88 
CH  0/ 13  1/ 0  1/ 0  2/ 0  0/ 0  0/ 0  4/ 13 
CL  0/ 0  0/ 0  3/ 0  2/ 0  0/ 0  0/ 0  5/ 0 
* Notes: „Spikes‟ are quantity postings of zero, or a price postings that yield sales of zero.  „Surges‟ are 
consecutive  periods  of  quantity  postings  below,  or  price  postings  above  the  best  reply  by  a  margin 
sufficient to miss the forecasting prize (10 minimum). Bolded entries highlight instances where  prices 
deviated markedly from Nash predictions in the BL treatment. 
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Figure A1. Seller responses to forecasts, periods 1-10. 
 
 